





healing. My discussion of the subprime mortgage
market will be brief as that topic was the subject
of a speech of mine this past July.1 The history of
market upsets is valuable in understanding the
current situation; I’ll discuss two such situations—
the 1987 stock market crash and the one initiated
by the 1998 Russian default—to illustrate issues
important to understanding the current market
upset. I’ll finish by offering some thoughts on
how the healing process works and the role of
the central bank.
Before proceeding, I want to emphasize that
the views I express here are mine and do not
necessarily reflect official positions of the Federal
Reserve System. I thank my colleagues at the
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis for their com-
ments, especially Daniel L. Thornton, vice presi-
dent in the Research Division, who provided
special assistance. However, I retain full respon-
sibility for errors.
THE FINANCIAL TURMOIL OF
2007
By 2006 a variety of indicators were suggest-
ing that the housing boom was subsiding. It was
not yet clear, however, that the boom was a bub-
ble that would be bursting. Sales of new single-
family homes—which had increased rapidly
during the previous five years—began to decline
following the sales peak in July 2005, and the
decline continued throughout 2006. By the end
of 2006, housing starts had dropped to a three-
year low. Perhaps more ominously, during 2006
A
nyone who has followed the news at
all since early August is well aware
of disorder in financial markets. This
episode is not yet complete. The
financial turmoil of 2007 will join previous
market upsets analyzed with such great insight
by the economic historian, Charles Kindleberger.
His book, Manias, Panics, and Crashes, is an
indispensable resource describing such episodes
over the past several hundred years.
Although we know a lot about market upsets,
relatively little work has been done on recoveries
from them. This topic is clearly an important one
today—the current episode of market turmoil is
not yet completed and therefore is not yet just a
matter for economic historians. Policymakers are
watching closely and considering what additional
policy measures, if any, would assist the market
healing process.
When arriving information triggers a financial
market trauma, we know that the trauma reflects,
typically, a flight to quality as investors react to
new information suggesting that certain assets
may be worth less than previously thought.
Market turmoil subsides over time as stabilizing
market forces take hold, typically as investors
search for bargains among assets with depressed
prices. Policy responses can assist the healing
process, but it is important that policy actions
harness market forces and not further disrupt
them. Over the longer run, lessons from market
turmoil may suggest reforms to laws and regula-
tions to reduce the probability of recurrence.
I will discuss the recent troubles in the sub-
prime mortgage market and evidence of market
1 See Poole (2007) for a much more complete discussion of the subprime mortgage market.the mortgage foreclosure rate began to increase,
going above 0.5 percent for the first time in the
nearly 35-year history of the series. Contributing
to the problem, residential property values began
to decline in many regions of the United States
and, according to the most recently available
data, the decline is continuing. According to the
Case-Shiller 10-city home price index, the first
month showing a 12-month decline was January
2007, and that was the first such decline in more
than a decade.2
By early 2007, evidence of difficulties in the
subprime mortgage market began to emerge.
Between December 2006 and August 2007 scores
of mortgage companies ceased operations, either
through bankruptcy or suspension of current
activity. Other mortgage companies reported
large losses and suspended their subprime mort-
gage lending. In June 2007, Bear Stearns pledged
up to $3.2 billion to bail out a hedge fund that
made bad bets in the subprime mortgage market.
A month later, Bear Stearns announced that two
of its hedge funds that invested heavily in secu-
rities backed by subprime mortgages had lost over
90 percent of their value. Both funds declared
bankruptcy on August 1.
According to a Treasury department annual
survey, which was released in March 2007, on
June 30, 2006, foreigners held nearly $1 trillion
in asset-backed securities. Precise data are unavail-
able, but a rough guess is that as of mid-2006 for-
eign holdings of securities backed by subprime
mortgages were $100 to 150 billion. Consequently,
problems in the U.S. subprime mortgage market
spread financial disorder worldwide. On July 30,
the European Central Bank (ECB) announced
that it was providing liquidity support for IKB
Deutsche Industriebank, a large German bank,
which had made substantial investments in U.S.
mortgage-backed securities.
Despite all the bad news, broad financial
markets were initially little affected. Although
the volume of trading in asset-backed commer-
cial paper (ABCP) peaked in late June and began
to decline, rates on such paper had increased
only a few basis points before August 9. But on
August 9, American International Group—one of
the largest mortgage lenders in the United States—
announced that mortgage defaults were spreading
beyond the subprime market. This news added
to concerns stemming from a July 24 announce-
ment by Countrywide Financial Corporation—
the largest U.S. originator of mortgages in 2006—
that subprime mortgage problems had spread to its
portfolio of prime mortgages. Between August 8
and September 13 the rate on ABCP increased by
84 basis points. While ABCP rates had declined
to early August levels by late September, the vol-
ume of outstanding ABCP continued to decline.
A short digression is in order at this point.
Commercial paper is a short-term corporate IOU.
There are three main types of commercial paper—
issues by non-financial firms, issues by financial
firms such as auto-finance companies and asset-
backed paper. The assets backing ABCP may be
subprime mortgages, credit card receivables, auto
loans or other similar assets. The maturity of
commercial paper ranges from one to 120 days.
In 2006, for example, 90 percent of the outstanding
paper had maturities of 40 days or less and only
5 percent had maturities of 81 days or more. At
the end of 2006, paper issued by non-financial
firms was 9.3 percent of the total, by financial
firms 37.9 percent of the total, and ABCP was
53.8 percent of the total.
The market turmoil began as investors started
to flee ABCP. It is normal practice for investors
in commercial paper to roll over their investment
in whole or in part, depending on their own need
for funds, but in August investors who might
have routinely rolled over their investment in
ABCP began asking for redemption as the paper
matured. Moreover, investors tended to flee all
types of commercial paper and not just paper
backed by subprime mortgages. Their unwilling-
ness to roll over maturing paper put tremendous
pressure on issuers to find funds to redeem matur-
ing issues. Many issuers turned to commercial
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2 The Case-Shiller 20-city index is also declining but that series goes back only to 2000.banks, drawing on backup lines of credit. Investors
had to do something with the funds on maturing
CP, and they tended to buy short-term Treasury
securities. Thus, the flight to quality drove up
the rates on CP and drove down the rates on
Treasury issues.
Two figures can help to display the scale of
the market disruption. Figure 1 shows the federal
funds rate and the Treasury bill rate. Vertical lines
mark some of the key events. The extent of credit
market volatility is evident. Figure 2 shows what
happened to the volume of commercial paper
outstanding. The scale of the contraction is obvi-
ous, as commercial-paper issuers had to redeem
scores of billions of dollars worth.
On August 9, both the European Central Bank
and the Federal Reserve injected large amounts of
liquidity into the financial market. On August 9,
the ECB injected ᾬ95 billion and the Fed injected
$24 billion; subsequently, the two central banks
engaged in further large injections of funds.
The Fed’s injections of funds were designed
to keep the federal funds rate near the target rate
set by the Federal Open Market Committee
(FOMC), the Fed’s main monetary policy body.
However, given the volatile market situation, the
Open Market Desk tended, appropriately, to pro-
vide funds generously. The funds rate traded high
relative to the FOMC’s target of 5.25 percent on
the 9th but declined sharply on the 10th.
Another indicator of market turmoil was the
rate on short-term Treasury bills. These rates
declined in the flight to quality. The 1-month T-
bill rate declined by 44 basis points on August 15
and by another 105 basis points on August 16.
On August 17, the Fed announced a 50-basis-
point cut in the discount rate.
Market turmoil originated in the market for
securities backed by subprime mortgages but then
spread to five important market segments beyond
the asset-backed securities market. The first was
the commercial-paper market more generally.
The volume of ABCP outstanding—much of
which was mortgage backed—peaked in the week
ending August 8. By mid-October, the outstanding
volume had declined by $281 billion, or nearly
25 percent.
The impact on financial and non-financial
commercial paper was less severe but significant.
The volume of non-financial commercial paper
outstanding declined by nearly 15 percent, while
the volume of financial paper declined by about
5 percent from early August to mid-October.
Despite the impact on the volumes of non-finan-
cial and financial commercial paper outstanding,
the impact on the rates of these securities was
relatively modest. Rates on both types of CP
remained near their pre-August 9 level until early
September and then began drifting lower. These
rates declined by about 25 basis points following
the FOMC’s 50-basis-point cut in the federal funds
rate target on September 18.
Another indication of market turmoil was
that rates on certificates of deposit (CDs) and
Eurodollar deposits rose sharply on August 9 on
news that the subprime problems were spreading
to the broader mortgage market. CD and Euro-
dollar rates rose because both of these assets are
used by banks and other depository institutions
to support their loan portfolios. Banks’ need for
liquidity drove these rates higher. Both rates
declined when the FOMC reduced its target for
the federal funds rate on September 18, but the
spread of these rates over the funds rate target
did not return to its pre-crisis level.
The financial turmoil spilled over to rates on
bank deposits in foreign countries. That spread
occurred partly because of the close relationship
between CD and Eurodollar deposit rates and simi-
lar assets in other countries and partly because
many international investors held securities
backed by U.S. subprime paper. Deposit rates in
Canada, the United Kingdom and the Euro area
were affected similarly to the CD and Eurodollar
rates in the United States. Danish and Japanese
rates changed little on average, but became much
more volatile.
The flight to quality had a dramatic effect on
rates in the U.S. Treasuries market. T-bill rates
declined relative to rates on assets with default
risk. The flight to quality is most evident at the
shorter end of the yield curve. The flight to qual-
ity at the longer-end of the yield curve occurred






Subprime Crisis: Funds Rate and Funds Rate Target
Figure 2
Total Outstanding Commercial Paper (s.a.)and BBB bonds over the 10-year Treasury yield
widened significantly in mid-July. The AAA
spread had been about 60 basis points and the
BBB spread about 120 basis points, but the two
spreads widened to about 75 and 165 basis points,
respectively, and have fluctuated in a wide range
around these levels since then.
The disorder also showed up in the federal
funds market, as is evident in Figure 1. The funds
rate spiked above the FOMC’s target of 5.25 per-
cent on August 9 and then fell below the target
the following day. Given the market disruption,
the Fed’s Open Market Desk supplied reserves
liberally, and the funds rate remained below the
target until September 14, the Friday before the
FOMC reduced the target from 5.25 to 4.75 per-
cent on September 18. The funds rate has traded
around the target since then, but in a wider band
and is more volatile than it was before August 9.
I can summarize key features of the market
upset this way. The turmoil began with disclosure
of large losses on securities backed by subprime
mortgages. Commercial-paper investors began to
flee asset-backed commercial paper, putting their
funds instead into safe assets, especially Treasury
securities. Companies that had relied on funding
their assets by issuing commercial paper were
stressed to come up with funds to redeem matur-
ing paper. They turned to a combination of asset
sales, which put downward pressure on certain
asset prices, and to bank loans, which put pres-
sure on banks to find the funds to fulfill their
commitments to provide backup credit to com-
mercial-paper issuers. The flight to quality was
so intense that many investors initially turned
away from all commercial paper, whether backed
by subprime mortgage assets or not.
ROLE OF THE FED
The Fed’s objective is to promote maximum
sustainable economic growth by fostering price
stability and minimizing, to the extent possible,
fluctuations in employment. The Fed can con-
tribute to these objectives by helping financial
markets to operate in an orderly and efficient
manner. The Fed promotes financial-market effi-
ciency through various regulatory measures and
by providing the markets with ample liquidity in
times of stress.
Most of the time, financial markets are highly
efficient. The Fed’s role is to conduct monetary
policy effectively in pursuit of the objectives of
price and employment stability. The Fed tries to
conduct open market operations with as much
regularity and predictability as possible, to pro-
vide a stable base for markets to trade a wide
range of financial assets efficiently.
On occasion, however, events disrupt nor-
mal market processes and special Fed action is
helpful. The major role for the Fed here is to see
that there is adequate liquidity in times of uncer-
tainty and to provide additional short-term liquid-
ity when there is a legitimate need for it. There
are numerous instances when the Fed has pro-
vided extra liquidity. The most dramatic example
is the attack on the World Trade Center, when the
Fed injected as much as $140 billion for a few
days to support financial market transactions. A
much less well-known example is that the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York advanced the Bank of
New York $22.6 billion overnight on November 21,
1985, because of a computer software failure at
the Bank of New York. The liquidity supplied in
August 2007 through open market operations and
the discount window is just the latest example
of the Fed supplying short-term liquidity to sup-
port financial markets in unusual circumstances.
There are times when providing additional
liquidity is either unnecessary or inadequate. A
dramatic example of such a time is the stock
market crash on “black Monday,” October 19,
1987. Before the markets opened on October 20,
the Fed announced that, “The Federal Reserve,
consistent with its responsibilities as the Nation’s
central bank, affirmed today its readiness to
serve as a source of liquidity to support the eco-
nomic and financial system.” The Fed made clear
that depository institutions could avail themselves
of the discount window as needed, even though
doing so might not meet all the usual adminis-
trative requirements then in effect.
Market Healing
5It was important for the Fed to make clear to
banks that discount window funds were available.
However, few banks actually borrowed. Before
the crash, borrowing during the week ending
October 15 averaged $1.147 billion; for the week
ending October 22, average borrowing was only
$219 million higher. Liquidity turned out not to
be an issue.
Concerns that the stock market crash might
spread to the economy more generally and affect
economic growth prompted the FOMC to reduce
its target for the federal funds rate by 50 basis
points on November 4, 1987. The FOMC cut the
target fed funds rate despite the fact that inflation
was running at an unacceptably high rate of over
4 percent. The FOMC reduced the target by an
additional 30 basis points by February 11, 1988.3
Once the crisis had passed, the FOMC began rais-
ing the target fed funds rate. By May 1988 the tar-
get was only slightly below its pre-crash level.
With the economic crisis past, the FOMC was able
to resume its effort to stabilize the price level. By
late June 1988 the funds rate target was above its
pre-crash level.
Another market upset occurred when Russia
defaulted on its sovereign debt on August 17, 1998.
In and of itself, this event posed no specific liquid-
ity problems for the U.S. economy. The picture
began to change when, on August 26, it was dis-
closed that George Soros’ Quantum Fund lost $2
billion in Russian markets. The following day the
spread between AAA rated corporate bonds and
the 10-year Treasury yield increased 10 basis
points. The spread continued to widen as news
of fallout from the Russian default intensified. The
spread widened to 99 basis points on September 2,
when Long Term Capital Management (LTCM)
announced that market developments had wiped
out about half of its capital, which was minimal
to begin with. While hedge funds can lose capital
for a variety of reasons, it was well-known that
hedge funds that invested heavily in emerging
markets, especially Russia, suffered large losses.
The spread rose further to 114 basis points on
September 23, when the Federal Reserve Bank of
New York helped organize a rescue package for
LTCM. By that time, LTCM’s equity had declined
by nearly 90 percent. The rescue package con-
sisted of a capital infusion by several investment
banks. In return, the participating banks got a 90
percent share in the fund and a promise that a
supervisory board would be established.
In 1998, the economy was experiencing
strong growth and inflation was well contained.
In this environment, concerns that the effects of
the Russian default might spread to the real econ-
omy prompted the FOMC to reduce the funds
rate target by 75 basis points, in three steps of 25
basis points each, between September 29 and
November 17.
In 1999, as economic growth remained strong
and inflation pressures began to rise, the FOMC
began reversing its actions. By mid-November
1999 the fed funds rate target had reached its
pre-Russian default level. By the spring of 2000,
the funds rate target was 6.5 percent—100 basis
points higher than before the Russian default.
LOOKING AHEAD
The 1987 and 1998 episodes, and others,
provide the best picture we have of how the cur-
rent market turmoil is likely to be resolved. Each
episode of financial turmoil has its individual
characteristicsbuttheyalsohavecommonfeatures.
As we think through the current situation, it
is useful to separate the issues of distress in the
housing market from financial turmoil beyond
housing. The woes in the housing market may
continue for some time. Home prices are declining.
Sales of single-family houses have been declining
and the inventory of single-family houses for sale
has been rising. No one should feel much confi-
dence in a forecast as to when the housing market
will stabilize; the conventional view among
housing experts and economic forecasters seems
to be around the middle of 2008.
3 During this period, the FOMC sometimes changed the intended fed funds rate by amounts other than in multiples of 25 basis points. There
were actually two changes, one of 18.75 basis points on January 27 and another of 12.5 basis points change on February 11. I have added
these together and rounded off in the text.
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gages are much less readily available than in the
past. Lenders have taken steps to avoid the lend-
ing practices that generated the crisis in the sub-
prime mortgage market, and we can be confident
that underwriting practices have improved in all
segments of the mortgage market. However, it will
take several years to resolve the problems with
outstanding subprime mortgages and securities
backed by such mortgages. Loan delinquency
rates, which have been trending up since mid-
2006, are likely to continue to rise. Many home-
owners will lose their homes to foreclosure, and
investors will have to write down the value of
their assets backed by subprime mortgages.
What creates generalized financial turmoil
out of a market problem is that investors flee
riskier assets of all types, with little regard to
whether the assets are connected to the original
problem or not. However, a flight to quality typi-
cally does not last very long. Investors start to
make the relevant distinctions as they search for
good assets trading at distressed prices.
That process is certainly observable today.
Broader financial markets are showing signs that
the financial market upset is beginning to resolve
itself. Rates on short-term T-bills have risen and
are at more normal levels relative to the federal
funds rate. Rates on many types of riskier assets
have declined. There appears to be only a modest
effect on rates in the conforming mortgage market.
The Freddie Mac index for the conventional 30-
year mortgage rate was 156 basis points above
the 10-year Treasury rate in June; at the end of
October, the spread was about 30 basis points
higher. Although the spread is a bit higher, the
absolute level of the conforming mortgage rate in
October was roughly 25 basis points below its
June level. However, the rate on prime jumbo
mortgages—mortgages whose size is above the
conforming mortgage limit of $417,000—was
about 100 basis points higher than the rate on
conforming mortgages from mid-August to mid-
September. The normal spread is about 25 basis
points. A sign of progress in market healing is
that the jumbo spread is currently about 60 basis
points.
The implications of the market upset for the
macroeconomy are not clear. Residential invest-
ment, which accounts for about 5 percent of GDP,
will continue to be a negative for economic
growth. Consequently, the decline in residential
investment, per se, will have a modest effect on
economic growth going forward.
At issue is the potential effect of the housing
decline on consumer expenditures. The loss of
wealth associated with the decline in housing
prices, as well as the fact that mortgage payments
will absorb a larger portion of disposable income
for some consumers, might cause consumption—
the largest component of GDP—to grow at a signifi-
cantly slower rate. While the effect of a change
in wealth on consumer expenditures has been
notoriously difficult to identify empirically,
some recent evidence suggests that changes in
housing wealth do affect consumption.4
THE HEALING PROCESS
What is the process by which financial mar-
kets return to normal functioning? I have already
emphasized that the most fundamental aspect is
that investors quickly begin drawing distinctions
between assets with prices depressed for good
reason and those depressed due to a generalized
flight to quality. It does make sense for securities
backed by subprime mortgages to trade at low
prices, because the default rate on subprime
mortgages is high and perhaps rising. Even here,
however, not all subprime mortgages were created
equal. Some firms originating these mortgages
had much better underwriting practices than
others. It is logical that investors will now dis-
tinguish between securities backed by subprime
mortgages originated by solid underwriters and
those by Sam’s Corner Mortgage Company.
Experience certainly suggests that central
bank rate reductions help spur the healing process.
Why should that be so?
Market Healing
7
4 For example, see Bostic, Gabriel and Painter (2005) and Catte, Girouard, Price and Andre (2004).One thing that happens is that cuts in the
policy rate—the federal funds target rate in the
United States—serve to reduce the absolute level
of rates on riskier securities even though spreads
may remain higher than before. In the United
States, comparing the July 2007 average with the
average for the week ending November 2, the
AAA corporate bond rate fell from 5.65 percent
to 5.15 percent and the BBB corporate bond rate
fell from 6.34 percent to 6.09 percent. The same
point applies to rates on many other risky assets.
Spreads against Treasuries are higher but the
absolute level of yields has returned to pre-
turmoil levels, or below in some cases.
Another thing that happens as a consequence
of central bank action is an improvement in con-
fidence. Stock market volatility might serve as a
good measure of confidence. The stock market
has been quite volatile since its peak on July 19.
By August 15, the S&P 500 stock index had
declined by 8.3 percent from its peak. Stocks
surged on September 18 following the FOMC’s
action reducing the fed funds rate target by 50
basis points. Subsequently, other news led to
sharp stock declines.
Despite market volatility, Fed actions have
demonstrated to market participants throughout
the economy—those in non-financial firms as
well as those in financial firms—that the Fed will
not be an idle bystander. The Fed needs to be
careful to do what is necessary, but not more.
Excessive rate reductions would run the risk of
increasing inflation in the future and inducing
further market volatility as the market came to
fear future rate increases to deal with rising infla-
tion. Market confidence that the Fed has it about
right and is prepared to take appropriate further
action helps in the healing process.
Let me also offer a conjecture. A cut in the
federal funds target rate changes the nature of
near-term risks facing market participants who
take positions in risky securities. I have empha-
sized that the willingness of market participants
to take risks is essential to the healing process
that restores normal trading in risky assets. When
the Fed cuts its target for the federal funds rate,
market participants know that the FOMC’s deci-
sion at its next meeting will be either to leave
the rate unchanged or to cut further. Barring
unusual circumstances, the FOMC would not
consider a rate increase just after cutting its fed
funds rate target. This approach to policy is
appropriate when market conditions are fragile
because market participants must be confident
that they can take positions without the risk that
the Fed might raise rates, which would reduce
asset values, in the near term. Investors can then
concentrate on determining the fundamental
value of risky assets and can work on deals to
buy such assets from holders forced to sell by
their own impaired liquidity and capital posi-
tions. As investors accumulate profits from these
trades, others are attracted and normal market
functioning resumes.
As markets return to normal, Fed policy can
also return to its normal focus on the long-run
needs of the economy. In June 1999, for example,
the Fed started to undo the rate cuts introduced
in the fall of 1998. It is impossible to determine
in advance what the schedule should be for the
return to normal monetary policymaking. In cur-
rent circumstances, it could be that the down-
draft from the housing industry will spread to
other sectors, which might require that recent
rate cuts not be reversed or even that additional
rate cuts would be in order. Conversely, as mar-
kets heal, the policy situation may return to one
resembling that of a few months ago in June,
before subprime problems began to have signifi-
cant market impact.
Although I am unable to forecast the future
course of the FOMC’s target for the federal funds
rate, I am confident that normal market function-
ing will return to the financial markets. Recent
weeks show clear progress. There could be set-
backs along the way, but the inherent efficiency
of U.S. financial markets will ultimately domi-
nate the outcome.
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